Our aim in this article is to analyse the provisions of the Trade Union Act 2016 that deal with pre-strike ballots and picketing. We also consider Government proposals to legislate in respect of protests associated with industrial action ('leverage action'), which were abandoned in favour of plans to amend the Code of Practice on Picketing. We note the suggestion made by several commentators and Opposition politicians that the Government might have intended with these changes to make it significantly more difficult for trade unions and workers to exercise their right to take industrial action and to engage in forms of protest associated with industrial action. Examining the stated policy aims of Government, and available evidence which speaks to those policy aims and to the likely impact of the new rules, we argue that the freedom of workers and trade unions to participate in and organise industrial action has indeed been narrowed very considerably by this Act; further, that the case for amending the existing legal framework was not at all well made.
Introduction
The focus of this article lies with the provisions of the Trade Union Act 2016 that deal with pre-strike ballots and picketing. In consulting upon these provisions, and as the Bill made its way through Parliament, the Government explained its policy objectives with reference to its concern about a lack of 'fairness' and 'democracy', and about the intimidation of non-striking workers. 1 It was 'undemocratic', the Government suggested, that under the current legislation, industrial action could take place on the basis of 'low ballot turnouts', with the support of only 'a small proportion of union members'. 2 It was 'unfair' that members of the public should be inconvenienced by a disruption of public services caused by industrial 4 Industrial Action Ballots and Notice to Employers accompanies the legislation. 10 In 1999 and 2004, efforts were made to simplify and clarify particular aspects of the law. 11 Notwithstanding these efforts, the balloting and notice provisions remain remarkably complicated, so that the exact nature of the steps which trade unions must take is not always clear. 12 Members of the judiciary routinely disagree as to extent of the unions' obligations, even in the upper courts. 13 Picketing is addressed directly in the TULRCA by a provision which renders it 'lawful' for a person (i) in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute (ii) to attend at or near his own place of work for the purpose of 'peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working'. 14 
A Code of Practice on
Picketing limits the number of pickets who may attend at any single entrance to 6in the eyes of the Courts, a larger number may constitute evidence that the workers had a purpose other than peaceful communication or persuasion, bringing their actions outside of the definition of such picketing as is deemed 'lawful'. 15 Only picketing which falls within the terms of that same definition may benefit from the statutory immunities from liability in tort referred to above. 16 Where workers engage in forms of protest in connection with an industrial dispute, which do not fall within the statutory definition of lawful picketing (for example because they are not at or near their own place of work), their actions may be found to constitute a wide variety of civil and criminal wrongs. 17 If they breach their contracts of employment, the tort of inducing breach of contract may apply to those who have organised the action. Private nuisance will apply where there is undue interference with a person's enjoyment of his or her property, and 10 Codes of Practice are not legally binding: TULRCA s. 207 11 other torts, such as assault, may apply to serious intimidation. 18 As far as criminal liability is concerned, there is what Ford and Novitz describe as a 'bewildering array of criminal offences regulating public protest in the UK', so that a wide range of behaviour is caught, and offences often overlap. 19 In addition, police have powers to give directions to protestors and others, and to arrest those who fail to comply. 20
Injunctions
As aptly noted by Ewing, the 'first aim of the employer in a dispute may be to prevent industrial action from taking place, and for this purpose an injunction may be sought'. 21 It is well accepted that injunctions 'in practice, … tend to be determinative of the dispute', 22 and 'that the requirements for obtaining an interim injunction are not onerous'. 23 Evidence shows that where interim injunctions are sought, they are granted much more often than not. 24 Where an interim injunction has been granted, the trade union will not usually re-ballot. 25 The ability of employers to succeed in their intent of stemming industrial action at its outset is typically the function of three distinct, but inevitably interlinked, factors. Firstly, it will depend on the ability of employers, and their counsel, to argue successfully that, should the contemplated industrial action go ahead, they would be the victims of a legal wrong. It is here that the statutory immunities assume practical importance, together with the legislative circumscription of the substantive and procedural requirements with which a union must comply in order to benefit from them. The greater in number and the more stringent these requirements, and the narrower the concept of 'protected' action, the higher the likelihood that the employers will be able to argue that one or more breaches will occur, resulting in the 18 action not being protected, and thus giving rise to a legal wrong and, possibly, an injunction. 26 Secondly, although this point is controversial, it will often depend on the ability of employers to convince the courts that, unless interim relief is granted pending the full trial, the wrong they are deemed to suffer will result in a loss that they would struggle to recover in a satisfactory way at trial. In effect, this 'involves a consideration of the losses which would be incurred on either side', 27 and a reintroduction of the 'balance of convenience' element of the American Cyanamid test by means of judicial intervention, 28 after Parliament had replaced it with the more attuned test currently contained in TULRCA, s. 221(2). 29 On paper, this statutory test exclusively requires that where a union against whom an injunction is sought claims to act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, 'the court shall, in exercising its discretion whether or not to grant the injunction, have regard to the likelihood of that party's succeeding at the trial of the action in establishing any matter which would afford a defence to the action under section 219 (protection from certain tort liabilities) or section 220 (peaceful picketing)', without any reference to a consideration of the economic losses the parties may suffer. In this sense, the judicial reintroduction of a 'balance of convenience' test is particularly problematic: '[o]nce the debate is deflected away from law onto extraneous matters of this kind, the union's arguments are never likely to prevail'. 30 Typically, businesses, especially larger ones, are far more likely to be able to demonstrate substantial losses as a direct consequence of the withdrawal of their workers' labour. Even 'where there are strong arguments either way the balance of convenience may still lead to an injunction being granted '. 31 In recent years, key judgments such as those in RMT v Serco 32 and Balfour Beatty 33 have robustly reasserted that 'it is unjust to trade unions to determine the question' 34 by reference 26 Section 232B TULR(C)A 1992 seeks to protect industrial action from the consequences of 'small accidental failures' made at specified stages of the balloting process. 27 to American Cyanamid and the 'balance of convenience' test, which 'almost always lies in favour of granting the injunction pending trial'. 35 A correct application of s. 221 'involves considering whether the union would be likely to be able to establish at trial that the immunities are applicable' or not. 36 But in spite of these important clarifications, the 'balance of convenience' test has retained an important, and arguably undeserved, presence in at least three important scenarios. 37 Under one interpretation of s. 221(2) TULR(C)A 1992, its more lenient provisions only apply when the action falls within the definition of action protected under s. 219 and peaceful picketing under s. 220 TULR(C)A. When this is not the case, for instance 'because there has been no ballot …, nor is the matter in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute as referred to in those sections [the courts] have to ask the questions which arise under traditional American Cyanamid principles'. 38 These principles will also be deployed when the strike is anticipated to fall outside the immunities because some of the stringent procedural requirements have been performed in an imperfect way, and appears to be vitiated by failures. 39 Secondly, it is clear that courts will fall back on American Cyanamid whenever 'the applicant suggests heads of liability which are not within the scope of the immunities, such as a breach of statutory duty'. 40 Finally, it is becoming increasingly clear that courts may adopt an American Cyanamid based 'balance of convenience' test where they judge that action which may, more likely than not, be designated at trial as TULRCA was the appropriate test under which the declaration ought to be considered, and even though the judge was satisfied that 'the "more likely than not" result at any trial of the issue would be that the NUT's strategy is to protect its members' jobs and conditions', 43 the decision still assessed the 'severe disruption to the education of students, to their parents, to the governing bodies of the sixth form colleges and to the work of the non-teaching staff employed'. 44 While Kerr J ultimately refused to issue a declaration, conceding that if 'wrongly granted now [it] would probably in practice defeat the exercise of such rights as the NUT has to call a strike without infringing the law', 45 the fact remains that courts will assess the impact of industrial action on the public interest, and presumably draw consequences from it in a way that puts a problematic gloss on the letter of s.221(2), even where action is called well within the narrow parameters of legality provided by Parliament.
This last point about the growing importance of 'public interest' considerations in the award of injunctions against strikes is arguably emerging as the third main factor shaping the ability of employers to stop industrial action in its tracks. It is clear, as noted above, that 'public interest' will be an important factor to consider even where the anticipated industrial action is deemed to be otherwise lawful. Various obiter dicta suggest that judges would apply a relatively high threshold, and look for consequences that would be particularly 'disastrous ', 46 causing 'immediate serious danger to public safety or health', 47 or 'endangers the nation or puts at risk such fundamental rights as the right of the public to be informed and the freedom of the press.' 48 But cases such as that involving the BA cabin crew dispute of 2009 suggest thatespecially where there are doubts regarding the ability of the union to vindicate the lawfulness of its actions at trialnothing as draconian is necessary. A court can grant an injunction on the basis that the action, among other things, is believed to be 'fundamentally more damaging' because it is 'taking place … over twelve days of the Christmas period', 49 and even because of 'the very serious inconvenience that the proposed action is likely to cause the travelling public'. 50 Judicial reference to the public interest in this context is therefore proceeding down a highly problematic slippery slope, especially when we consider that UK law, until the adoption by Parliament of the Trade Union Act 2016, had not expressly 43 Para 69. 44 sought to draw a distinction between general, and essential or 'important', services in the context of industrial action.
Pre-Strike Ballots
In respect of the requirement to ballot members in advance of taking industrial action, the effect of the amendments contained within the 2016 Act is to increase the threshold turnout and percentage of the vote that a trade union must secure if it is to benefit from the statutory immunities. Prior to the Act coming into force, planned industrial action had only to win the support of a simple majority of the relevant workers, regardless of the size of the turnout.
Under the new rules, in all ballots for industrial action, at least 50% of the union members entitled to vote must take part in the ballot in order for it to be valid. 51 For example, in a ballot affecting 200 union members, at least 100 of those members would have to vote in order for it to be valid, and a simple majority of those voting would have to vote in favour of taking industrial action. Furthermore, when industrial action is planned in 'important public services', trade unions must meet the additional requirement that 40% of all those entitled to vote should vote yes. 52 So, in a ballot affecting 200 union members, at least 100 of those members would have to vote, and at least 80 would have to vote in support of the industrial action.
According to the terms of section 3 of the Act, the higher threshold defined therein will apply wherever the majority of those entitled to vote in the ballot are 'normally engaged' in the provision of important public services. (An additional reference in the Bill to those normally engaged in the provision of services 'ancillary' to important public services was removed by Government after consultation highlighted the difficulties that would be involved in its application. 53 ) Section 3 goes on to provide that 'important public services' are to be defined in due course by the Secretary of State, 'who may specify only services that fall within any of Since 1993, the TULRCA has stipulated that pre-strike ballots must be conducted by way of a postal vote, administered in accordance with detailed rules under the supervision of an independent scrutineer. 55 The Trade Union Act does not yet relax these rules, but paves the way for change, providing in section 4 for an independent review on the delivery of secure methods of electronic balloting, and for the use of pilot schemes. The section stipulates that the review shall be commissioned within 6 months of the passing of the Act. It directs the Secretary of State to consider the report, and in preparing his or her response (to be published and laid before each House of Parliament) to 'consult relevant organisations including professionals from expert associations to seek their advice and recommendations'. 56 It does not commit the Government to introduce e-balloting; however, in the House of Commons, Business Minister Nick Boles gave a 'verbal guarantee' that e-balloting would be rolled-out provided that the review found it to be safe. 57 Sections 5 to 9 of the 2016 Act significantly augment the obligations placed on trade unions to provide notice and information in connection with the ballot and ensuing industrial action.
Of particular note is the rule contained in section 5, that in addition to the existing requirement that unions ask members, on the ballot paper, whether they wish to participate in a strike or action short of a strike, they must now also include 'a summary of the matter or matters in issue in the trade dispute'; specify, in the case of action short of a strike, the type or types of industrial action to be taken; and indicate the time period during which it is expected that the action will take place. 58 Further provisions extend the period of notice that must be given to the employer of the commencement of industrial action from 7 to 14 days, and replace the current requirement that there must be some industrial action within a period 54 of 4 to 8 weeks in order for the mandate to remain valid with a provision that the members' agreement to a union's proposed industrial action will automatically expire after six months. 59 When informing the relevant workers of the result of the ballot, as it is already required to do, a union must now include a statement of whether at least 50% of those entitled to vote did so, and, in the case of important public services, whether at least 40% of those entitled to vote voted yes. 60 Where a union fails to meet any of these new obligations, the statutory immunities will not apply. 61 Failure to meet an additional new requirementto inform the Certification Officer annually of any industrial action taken in the previous 12 monthscould result in the imposition by the Certification Officer of a financial penalty of between £200 and £20,000. 62
Explaining the changes
In seeking to explain the policy objectives underlying the changes to the balloting thresholds, the Government referred, as we have seen, to the need to ensure 'fairness' and 'democracy' in the organisation of industrial action. 63 The picture presentedby members of the Conservative Party, Government Ministers, and representatives of the CBI alikewas one of aggressive, even violent, union leaders, who, in pursuit of radically left-wing objectives, intimidated or 'bullied' members into taking part in industrial action despite their better judgment. 64 Some sympathy was extended to the 'bullied' union members and, much more so, to the disappointed would-be consumers of the public services affected by the industrial action. The conclusion drawn was that tougher legislative controls of industrial action were desirablein order to subject union leaders to the 'democratic' control of members, and to limit the occasions on which consumers might be inconvenienced by industrial action. The main features of this narrative were thus neatly encapsulated in the headline attached to a these Tube strike militants wrecking your lives'. 65 In Parliament, and in the policy documents published by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills, the language was somewhat more measured, but the message essentially the same. The Government's primary aim was to ensure that there was always 'clear and ongoing' support for industrial action. 66 A second objective, in cases where industrial action was likely to impact on the provision of 'important public services', was to make it more difficult for workers to strike, without going so far as to prohibit them from doing so. 67 In explaining the amendments to the information and notice provisions, the Government again referred to its wish to ensure 'fairness', 'democracy' and, also, 'transparency'. 68 In Committee in the House of Commons, the aim behind the rule in section 5, requiring unions to provide voters with a summary of the matter(s) at issue, was defended on the basis that it would ensure that unions were 'absolutely clear with members about what they were being asked to vote for'. 69 The section 7 obligation to report industrial action to the Certification Officer would serve 'transparency in the public interest', it was explained. 70 The increase of the required period of notice of the commencement of industrial action from 7 to 14 days was intended to allow the employer and trade union more time to resolve their dispute without the need for industrial action. 71 The new 'sunset' rule in section 9, that the mandate won in a ballot automatically expires after 6 months, was directed at ensuring that there was 'ongoing' support for industrial action. 72 As justification for the rules introduced by the 2016 Act, the Government's depiction of politically motivated union leaders organising industrial action against the wishes of a majority of the membership, and of industrial action in the public sector as routinely breaching the rights of consumers of 'important public services', may be objected to on a number of grounds. The first is the way in which it overlooks or obscures important elements 65 4 October, 2010. 66 'We've seen … strike action that took place where perhaps only 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the members … actually voted for it, and that's not right, it's unfair'. Sajid Javid, Business Secretary, Financial Times 10 January, 2015 67 See eg Sajid Javid on BBC News 12 May 2015, cited Darlington and Dobson, 5: 'by increasing the thresholds it will certainly increase the hurdles that need to be crossed'. ' of the already highly restrictive legal framework governing trade union organisation and industrial action. For example, it seems not to take account of the rule prohibiting trade unions from disciplining members who refuse to participate in, or to support, industrial action, regardless of the level of support shown for the action in the pre-strike ballot. 73 This of course places very significant limits on the kind of steps that union leaders may take in an effort to 'force' reluctant members to come out. Similarly, the Government's representation of intra-union relations seems to disregard the existence of detailed provisions requiring that trade union leaders be elected by members by way of a postal vote. 74 Finally, it obscures the fact that the (therefore democratically accountable) leaders are prohibited from using industrial action lawfully as a means of pursuing political objectives of their own (or anybody else's), by reason of the golden formula. 75 That the right to strike is an essential element of collective bargaining, that industrial action may often be organised as part of efforts to secure pay deals or defend pension rights, and that the pressure for it may come from the members and not the leadership, is barely admitted by the Government's portrayal of supposedly common practice.
A second related criticism of the Government's justification of the amendments is its lack of a solid evidentiary basis. In support of the claim that the existing rules on pre-strike ballots were undemocratic because they allowed small numbers of yes voters to force or coerce a silent majority into taking part in industrial action against its better judgement, for example, the Government provided evidence of low turn-outs in some pre-strike ballots, but no evidence that abstainers in those ballots opposed industrial action, or were coerced into taking part. 76 In debates in the House of Commons, Ministers often referred to specific examples of behaviour which they sought to present as typical or common, without providing evidence that those examples were in fact representative. 77 As it consulted on the Bill, the Government produced an Impact Assessment on Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services that was roundly criticised by the Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) for its lack of evidence, limited scope, and failure to explain the rationale for the proposals in a 'straightforward and logical' 73 TULRCA ss 64, 65 74 TULRCA ss 46-61 75 TULRCA ss 219, 244 76 eg Sajid Javid, Business Secretary, Financial Times 10 January, 2015; Nick Boles 20.10.2015 column 194 77 eg Sajid Javid 14.9.2015 column 765; Nick Boles 20.10.2015 columns 194-5, columns 195-6 support of the Government's claim that, as things stood, union members did not always understand the nature of the dispute giving rise to the ballot. 84 Similarly, no evidence was provided to show that extending the notice period in section 234A TULRCA from 7 to 14 days would likely result in more negotiated settlements of disputes. 85 The claim that the sunset rule introduced by section 9 was necessary to ensure that industrial action was always 'based on a current mandate', was also unsupported. 86 A third line of objection to the Government's explanation of the desirability of the legislation lies with the lack of fit between the professed policy objective of ensuring ongoing and clear support for industrial action, and the chosen method of achieving that aim. As several commentators have pointed out, to require that a particular percentage of an electorate take part in an electionin addition to requiring a majority vote in favouris to confer a special status on abstentions. 87 Imagine a case where 100 individuals are entitled to vote, and the rules require a turn-out of at least 50%, and of those voting, a simple majority in favour. In scenario 1, 50 votes are cast, 49 for and 1 against, and the ballot is won. In scenario 2, 49 of the electorate again vote yes, but the no-voter chooses to abstain with the result that the threshold of 50% is not met and the ballot is lost. As is thus illustrated, the imposition of participation thresholds means that a small number of abstentionspotentially even a single onemay frustrate or trump a much higher number of yes votes. Active opponents of strike action will therefore do well to abstain rather than voting noso that far from encouraging higher participation rates in pre-election ballots, as the Government apparently intended, the imposition of participation thresholds may provide a reason not to. It may also be noted here that the provision made in s. 4 of the Act for a review of secure methods of electronic balloting and the use of pilot schemes did not form part of the Bill as originally drafted. From the outset, trade unions and others argued that the aim of improving participation rates could be met more easily by permitting electronic balloting, for instance by email and/or text message. 88 The agreement of Government to include section 4 came very late in the day, in part acceptance of an amendment tabled in the House of Lords. 89 Likely Impact of the New Rules?
The likely impact of the new rules on the ability of trade unions and workers lawfully to organise and participate in industrial action may be assessed through consideration of (a) available evidence of ballot turnouts and results to date, and (b) judicial approaches to the interpretation of the legislation and the consideration of applications for injunctions. 90 Focusing on the new ballot thresholds, and applying these retrospectively to past ballots, Darlington and Dobson concluded that the impact of the new thresholds is likely to be significant. 91 Of a sample of 158 strike ballots held by 28 trade unions between 1997 and 2015, only around half met the 50% turnout threshold, and only 55 of 90 met the 40% support threshold. Importantly, very few of the large public sector unions which held one-day strikes in June and November 2011 met either threshold. Given the large numbers of workers involved in these public sector strikes, this meant that, had the new thresholds been in force, they would have prevented 3.3 million workers from exercising the right to strike. Analysing their findings further, Darlington and Dobson highlighted that it is national ballots, in particular, that will be difficult to win under the new rules: workplace, area and single employer ballots routinely attract higher turnouts. 92 Unions with members who have close occupational identities will likely find it easier to meet the thresholds than more general unions. 93 In addition to making it more difficult to win ballots, the rules contained in sections 2-9 of the Act would also appear to provide fertile ground for future applications for injunctions. 94 88 Taken together, the rules in section 5 bind the union to carry out a course of action devised at the time of the ballot, thereby preventing it from developing its strategy in line with changing circumstances and priorities. 100 The extension in section 8 of the period of notice that must be given to an employer of the commencement of industrial action from 7 to 14 days provides an employer with additional time to hire replacement agency workers, as it may in the future be 95 permitted to do. 101 The sunset rule contained in section 9, meanwhile, might cause a union to have to repeat the whole lengthy and costly balloting process when the six month mandate comes to an end. Pointing at committee stage to the marked lack of evidence provided by the Government to show that these provisions would meet their stated policy objectives of greater transparency and accountability, Opposition politicians suggested that the true intention was to tie the unions up in 'blue tape' (as opposed to red tape) to the point where their rights and those of workers had become 'illusory'. 102 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this strikes us as persuasive.
Picketing and Protest
In respect of picketing, the Trade Union Act introduces seven new conditions that must be met if picketing is to be deemed 'lawful' under section 220 TULRCA. Under the terms of a new section 220A, the union must (i) appoint a person to supervise the picket, who is (ii) either an official or a member of the union, and in either case familiar with the relevant provisions of the Code of Practice. The union must (iii) take reasonable steps to tell the police the picket supervisor's name, where the picketing will be taking place, and how to contact the picket supervisor. And it must (iv) provide the 'picket supervisor' with a letter stating that the picketing is approved by the union. The picket supervisor must (v) on request,
show that letter to the employer and/or to any individual acting on behalf of the employer.
She must (vi) at all times be either present at the picket, or readily contactable by the union and the police, and able to attend at short notice. Whenever present, she must (vii) wear something (eg a badge or armband) that readily identifies her as the picket supervisor. Failure to comply with any one of these conditions will mean that the picketing in question is not deemed lawful by the Act, regardless of whether or not the failure has prejudiced the employer in any way. 103 As a result, the statutory immunities from liability in tort will not apply; workers will lose their protection from unfair dismissal. 104 In respect of forms of protest organised in connection with an industrial dispute other than modernization of existing rules so as to ensure that they covered social media. 105 In light of the responses received to that Consultation, which again offered very little by way of support for the proposals, the Government decided not to implement any of these within the Act, but instead only to amend the accompanying Code of Practice on Picketing. 106 In particular, it intends to amend the Code so as:
 to clarify the range of legal protections which already exist to protect striking and non-striking workers, whether union members or not  to set out clearly the existing legal protections against the misuse of social media and to provide guidance for those people who wish to seek redress where they have suffered online intimidation as a result of industrial disputes  to set out additional advice regarding the 'transparency' of trade unions  to clarify the rights and responsibilities of all those involved in or impacted upon by protests linked to industrial disputes. 107
Protecting non-striking workers from intimidation?
Since the publication of its Manifesto in 2015, the Government has justified the changes to the law on picketing consistently with reference to the need to 'protect non-striking workers from intimidation', 108 stating that '[w]hile this Government recognises that picketing is a lawful activity, we are equally clear that it should never be used as an opportunity to intimidate others'. 109 In the Consultation, it explained that the primary means chosen to achieve this aim would involve giving legal force to existing parts of the Code of Practicethose that were 'consistent with well organised industrial action'. 110 In respect of protests associated with picketing, the potential victims of intimidation and other forms of 'unacceptable' behaviour were identified more widely by the Consultation than they had been in the Manifesto to include representatives of management, and members of the public, as well as non-striking workers. 112 One key problem to be addressed, it was said in the Consultation, was the development in recent years of forms of leverage protest which were not caught by the terms of the TULRCA and other legislation. 113 Action was needed to prevent 'unacceptable conduct' in the future and, where it could not be prevented, to allow for the enforcement of strong remedies. 114 In its own Response to the Consultation, the Government emphasised, in particular, its concern about 'intimidation online' and in social media. 115 Recognising now, however, that there were in fact 'no significant gaps in the legal framework', it suggested instead that there was a need to, 'raise awareness of existing protections and ensure that they are used to maximum effect '. 116 As justification for the changes to the rules on picketing contained in the 2016 Act, and the proposed amendments to the Code of Practice, the principal criticism that can be made of the Government's statements lies, again, with their lack of a solid evidentiary basis. Certain of the claims made in the Consultationfor example that the rules in section 220A will have 'little impact on responsible picketing' because the relevant parts of the Code are already respected by most unionswere supported by no empirical evidence whatever. 117 Elsewhere, there was frequent and lengthy reference to the 'evidence' submitted to the Carr Review. This was a Review commissioned by the Government in 2013 from the barrister Bruce Carr QC into the alleged use of extreme tactics in industrial action, including leverage tactics. 118 As Mr Carr took pains to emphasise, however, the 'evidence' that the Review collated was, in truth, little more than a set of allegations. 119 industrial fence or by any form of inquisitorial process at oral hearings'. And it was 'largely one-sided', coming 'overwhelmingly from employers or those acting on behalf of them'. For these reasons, Mr Carr chose not to seek to make findings of fact in his Report. 120 In its Consultation, in contrast, the Government was not particularly careful to distinguish between allegations and matters of fact. It acknowledged in a single footnote that 'all events mentioned [in the Report] remain alleged', 121 but elsewhere made statements of purported fact that were supported only by reference to some or all of those same events. 122 In addition, it referred to 'evidence' supplied to Carr by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) of reports of intimidatory tactics that had been used during industrial disputes, 123 without mentioning the fact that the ACPO had described the current legal framework as generally effective. 124 The ACPO had not asked for an extension of its powers, but rather only better guidance for the police.
In common with the Consultation on Balloting Thresholds, this second Consultation was notable for the way in which it presented itself as an evidence-gathering exercise, seeking to find support for decisions already made. First and foremost, it sought, it said, to collect evidence of intimidatory behaviour experienced during picketing and protests linked to industrial disputes. It also sought evidence on whether further provisions of the Code of Practice ought to be made legally binding, in addition to those already identified. As the Government later went some way to admitting, the Consultation in the event revealed little in the way of evidence of intimidation and little by way of support for its legislative proposals.
Only 177 responses were received. Of those, a clear majority indicated that they had neither experienced nor observed incidents of intimidatory behaviour during industrial disputes. 125 In partial contradiction, perhaps, of the Government's claim that the use of social media was a 'clear and prominent concern throughout most of the responses', only 16 responses cited use of social media as an example of intimidatory behaviour. 126 As with the introduction of the balloting thresholds, it may also be doubted whether the new rules on picketing supervisors are the best means of achieving the policy aims described by the Government. As Ford and Novitz have emphasised, criminal law already provides protection against intimidation on the picket line. 128 Moreover, the kinds of 'intimidatory' behaviour listed in the Consultation would already fall outside the definition of 'lawful picketing' in section 220 TULRCA, and might also constitute torts such as public nuisance. 129 The question arises then why, if the aim is to prevent intimidatory behaviour, conditions should be imposed upon those who are picketing peacefully, as s 220 already requires? Why should the consequence of failure to meet those conditions (even for those who are picketing peacefully) be forfeiture of the protection of the statutory immunities and, for individual workers, protection from unfair dismissal? The Government's claim to recognise that 'picketing is a lawful activity', 130 is difficult indeed to reconcile with the steps it has taken so dramatically to narrow the circumscription of the forms of picketing that are deemed 'lawful' by the Act.
What is left of the right to picket?
Notwithstanding the Government's assertion that section 10 enacts a set of rules that are anyway adhered to by 'most unions', it is easy to imagine circumstances in which one or two of the new requirements may be practically very difficult to comply with. 131 Where an industrial dispute involves many workers employed at a large number of workplaces, an equally large number of 'picket supervisors' may have to be appointed by the union if it is to satisfy the terms of the Act. Where this number exceeds the number of trade union officials available, as well it might, the union will have to rely on volunteer membersif such can be found. Volunteers will have to be trained ('familiar with any provisions of [the] Code of Practice'). They will have to be available throughout, either present at the picket, or readily 127 BIS/15/621, para 29, 44, 51 128 contactable by the union and the police, and able to attend at short notice. 132 And they will have to be willing to draw attention to themselves as 'active' union members, by having their name reported to the police, and by making themselves easily identifiable. For these reasons, members may well be reluctant to step forward.
What is the likely impact of the rules, then, on trade union practices? In his research into the frequency, nature and context of the use of injunctions in industrial disputes, Gregor Gall has noted the very low incidence of applications for injunctions which apply to picketing. 133 He explains this with reference to the already highly restrictive legal framework, and the consequent steep decline in attempts by unions to use picketing 'effectively' ie to prevent the movement of workers and goods into and out of a workplace. In other words, so ineffective are most pickets, that employers have little to gain by preventing them by means of an injunction from continuing. If Gall is rightand as we have seen, the Government produced scant evidence to suggest otherwisethen the new, even more restrictive rules seem unlikely to result in a sharp increase in applications for injunctions to prevent picketing, even if, on paper, they appear to create several opportunities for litigation as to the precise nature of the obligations imposed. 134 A more plausible scenario, perhaps, is that finding it increasingly difficult to picket lawfully, unions may make greater use of precisely the types of leverage action which the Government claimed in its Consultation to wish to put a stop to. 135 Introducing the Trade Union Bill at its second reading, the Secretary of State stated the following:
[T]his Bill is not a declaration of war on the trade union movement. It is not an attempt to ban industrial action. It is not an attack on the rights of working people… It is simply the latest stage in the long journey of modernisation and reform. It will put power in the hands of the mass membership; bring much-needed sunlight to dark corners of the movement; and protect the rights of everyone in this country-those who are union members and those who are not, and those hard-working men and women who are hit hardest by industrial action. 136 Notwithstanding the protestations of the Minister, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that one, at least, of the Government's main aims with this legislation was to make it harder for trade unions to organise industrial action, and thereby to weaken their ability to protest or resist measures taken by employers, especially in the public sector. Indeed, with respect to industrial action in 'important public services', this was quite explicitly the objective. 137 The narrative provided by Government was of trade unions dominated by militant, bullying leaders acting in disregard of the wishes of the membership and, even more so, the general public. Trade unions needed to be reined in, held to account, have greater light shone upon their shady dealings. While this account may have possessed a measure of internal logic (if unions were in fact dominated by militant, bullying leaders then it would indeed be important to introduce stronger elements of democratic control), it was almost wholly unsupported by evidence. 138 Nor were the measures contained within the Act, and the Bill as originally drafted, always shown to constitute the most effective means of addressing the 'problems' identified by Government, had such problems existed.
Research suggests that, as a result of the introduction of the new measures, it will become markedly more difficult for unions to secure the required threshold levels of support in perstrike ballots, especially national (predominantly public sector) ballots, and those organised by large 'generalist' trade unions. In some circumstances, it will be near impossible to organise pickets so that they fall within the now astoundingly narrow definition of what is lawful in that context. Perhaps the most significant feature of the Act is the number of opportunities it appears likely to create for employers to raise actions for interim relief. In light of the narrative offered by Government in support of the Act, and especially its highly reductive definition of the public interest as essentially coincident with the interests of consumers and businesses, we fear that it might propel members of the judiciary further down the slippery slope identified above: granting interim injunctions to prevent industrial action that is judged more likely than not to be found at trial to be protected action taken in relation to a valid industrial dispute, but likely nonetheless to damage the public interest.
We conclude this analysis of the Trade Union Act 2016 by noting that if the same turnout and support requirements contained in sections 2-3 of the Act had been applied to the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum of 23 June 2016, the 51.89 per cent of votes in favour of leaving the EU, coupled with a 72.2 per cent turnout, would have resulted in the United Kingdom remaining a full member of the European project. 139 
